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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MELVIN E. INGERSOLL and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No.

17245

RICHARD M. CAMP, SECOND INJURY:
FUND and INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION:
OF UTAH,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS

NATURE OF CASE
This is a Workman's Compensation Act case dealing with a
claim by injured employee Richard M. Camp against his employer
Ingersoll Construction Company and its insurance carrier, The
Utah State Insurance Fund (hereinafter plaintiffs) for injuries
suffered in an industrial accident that happened on August 6,
1975.

(R. 3)

Mr. Camp also joined the Special or Second Injury

Fund (hereinafter defendant) as a party pursuant to §35-1-68 and
69 U.C.A.
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
On May 20, 1980, the Administrative Law Judge of the
Industrial Commission entered an Order finding Richard M. Camp
permanently and totally disabled,

awarding him benefits from the
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Second Injury Fund, and requiring the Second Injury Fund to
reimburse a certain percentage of the medical and temporary
total compensation benefits to plaintiffs pursuant to §35-1-69
U.C.A.

(R. 234-236)

On May 29, 1980, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Review
challenging the percentage to be reimbursed.

(R. 237-238)

That Motion for Review was denied by the Industrial Commission
with one of the three Commissioners dissenting.

(R. 240)

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Order of the
Industrial Commission denying reimbursement of 32% of the amount
advanced to Richard M. Camp in compensation benefits for medical
expenses and periods of temporary total disability pursuant to
§35-1-69 U.C.A. be reversed and remanded to the Industrial
Commission for an appropriate Order of reimbursement to be entered
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Richard M. Camp, the applicant before the Industrial Commission, was injured on the job while employed by Ingersoll
Construction Co. on August 6, 1975.

At that time he fell 16

feet from scaffolding after a brick archway on which he was
working broke away.

(R. 3, 118-122)

Mr. Camp had a great many medical complications both physcial
and psychiatric resulting from conditions that predated
the industrial injury as well as those that followed the industria
accident.

These complications are not particularly important

for this brief and therefore, will not be enumerated in detail
herein.

The ultimate medical conclusion is, however, important.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Dr. Jack L. Tedrow found him to be 50% physically impaired
as a result of psychiatric difficulties with 10% of that impairment
predating the industrial accident.

(R. 89-91)

Dr. Boyd

Holbrook found him to be orthopedically suffering from a 46%
permenent partial physical impairment as a result of his industrial accident.

Dr. Holbrook then used a standard table for

combining impairments to determine that Mr. Camp's total loss
of bodily function would be 68% with 3% pre-existing the
industrial accident.

(R.

97)

The Industrial Commission, using the above bodily impairment
figures as one of the factors, found Mr. Camp to be permanently
and totally disabled.

(R. 234)

Some other factors in the

record justify the conclusion of 100% disablement or unemployability are:
1.

That the applicant suffered from an unrated bilateral

nerve palsey, peripheral neuropathy or deterioration of the
peripheral nerves secondary to pre-existing chronic alcoholism.
(R.

50, 89-91, 141, 155, 157)
2.

That he had already registered for rehabilitation

training three months prior to the industrial injury and made
unsuccessful attempts at rehabilitation training after the
accident.
3.
(R.

(R. 61)
That he had been married five times without success.

37)

4.

That he had hurt his back before the industrial

accident which would at times lay him up though that condition had
not been rated.

(R. 144)
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5.

That he had intestinal obstruction operative procedures

related to drug overdoses in about 1973 that had not been
specifically rated.
6.

(R. 147)

That he had an extremely troubled childhood that

led to his only obtaining a 4th grade education.
7.

(R.

40)

That the only skill he had acquired was that of a

journeyman bricklayer, which occupation he could no longer
perform with his injuries.
8.

(R. 40)

That he is a man nearly 50 years of age.

(R. 159)

As is obvious, a percentage of his physical impairment is
not the result of the industrial accident and, therefore, not
the responsibility of the employer.

Furthermore, all of the

additional factors listed above which may be termed "employability" factors are likewise not the responsibility of the
employer and are not factually caused by Mr. Camp's employment
with plaintiff.
Plaintiffs did not and do not now object to the finding
of a 100% disability.

However, plaintiffs do object to

the reimbursement from defendant of only 4% of the amounts
already advanced for medical expenses and temporary total
compensation.

The basis for the decision by the Commission

to limit the reimbursement to 4% is that employability factors
are not to be considered in determining the obligation of
the Special Fund as stated in §35-1-69 U.C.A.
It is the position of plaintiffs that where there is a
pre-existing condition the employer is only responsible for
the proporation the bodily impairment from the industrial accident
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bears to the total disability whether that disability be total
or some lesser percentage.
ARGUMENT
THE EMPLOYER IS ONLY RESPONSIBLE FOR COMPENSATION AND MEDICAL CARE ATTRIBUTABLE
TO THE INDUSTRIAL INJURY.
It should be stated at this point that the argument that
follows is nearly identical to that offered in the case of
Northwest Carriers, Inc. et al. v. Industrial Commission of
Utah, Supreme Ct. No. 17170.

From plaintiffs' view the issues

in the two cases are the same and should be considered at the
same time to conserve the Court's time as much as possible.

For

that purpose, a separate Motion for Consolidation is being
filed simultaneiously with this brief.
The Industrial Commission takes an interesting approach
to the issue of the apportionment in a permanent and total case
such as the one currently before this Court.

However, the

approach is in error and fails to take into account the clear
statement of the responsibility of the employer and the employer's
insurance carrier in §35-1-69 U.C.A.

The pertinent parts are

as follows:
. . . compensation and medical care . • . shall
be awarded on the basis of the combined injuries,
but the liability of the employer for such
compensation and medical care shall be for the
industrial injury only and the remainder shall
be paid out of the Special Fund . . . .
A medical panel . . . shall review all medical
aspects of the case . . . the Industrial Commission shall then assess the liabili~y for
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compensation and medical care to the employer
on the basis of the percentage of permanent
physical impairment attributable to the industrial
injury only and the remainder shall be payable
out of the said Special Fund . . . . (emphasis added)
The clear and unequivocal language of §35-1-69 is to the
effect that the employer is responsible for the industrial
injury only.

The employer is not responsible for factors that

were not caused by the industrial injury.

In the case at bar,

the date of the applicant's birth, his education, the availability of jobs, his intelligence quotient, the pre-existing
physical impairment, all of which contribute to his being
found permanently and totally disabled were not caused by
the industrial injury.

In order to accomplish what the

Industrial Commission is attempting by their order, it would
be necessary for legislative amendment.
The case of McPhie v. Industrial Comm'n, 567 P.2d 153
(Utah 1977) stands for the proposition that the Second Injury
Fund is to pay pursuant to §35-1-69 U.C.A. and §35-1-67, the
"remainder" of whatever is left to be paid after the employer
has discharged its liability.

The case of Intermountain Health

Care v. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977); White et al. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 604 P.2d 478 (Utah 1979); and Intermountain
Smelting v. Anthony Capitano, Sup. Ct. No. 16530 (March 24, 1980)
have further clarified the meaning of "remainder".

The employer

is responsible only for the industrial accident, the permanent
loss of bodily function or impairment attributable to the industrial accident and the percentage share that the permanent
partial loss of bodily function bears to the overall disability
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suffered by the injured workman for temporary total and medical
benefits.
To rule otherwise would be directly in contradiction of the
public policy which dictated the passage of the legislation
in the first place:
While at first glance it might appear that the
apportionment rule favors the employer and
nonapportionment the employee, in practice the
nonapportionment rule proved the worse of the
two evils from the standpoint of the handicapped
worker.
As soon as it became clear that a particular state had adopted a rule requiring an
employer to bear the full cost of total disability
for loss of the crippled worker's disability
for the loss of the crippled worker's remaining leg
or arm, employers had a strong financial incentive
to discharge all handicapped workers who might
bring upon them this kind of aggravated liability.
Under either rule, then, the compensation system
operated unsatisfactorily in the case of previously impaired workers:
Under apportionment
they received far less than their actual condition
required to prevent destitution; under nonapportionment they lost their jobs. Second Injury
Funds, which have been adopted in all but four
states, are the solution to this dilemma.
The
usual provision makes the employer ultimately
liable only for the amount of disability attributable to the particular injury occuring in
his employment, which the Fund pays the difference between that amount and the total amount
to which the employee is entitled for the combined effects of his prior and present injury.
(emphasis added)
Larson, Workman's Compensation Law, Vol. 2, Section 59.31 pp.

10-285 to 10-288.
It is clear from the wording of §35-1-69 U.C.A., supra,
that it is intended not only as a benefit to the employee, but
also as a limitation to the extent of liability of an employer
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so that the public policy stated by Prof. Larson can be satisfied.

The employer is not responsible for factors contri-

buting to disability other than the actual physical impairment
caused by the industrial injury.
Therefore, in the case at bar, plaintiffs are entitled
to a reimbursement of 32% of the benefits for temporary total
compensation and medical compensation advanced to Richard M.
Camp through the years.
CONCLUSION
The Industrial Commission of Utah acted in excess of
its administrative powers in failing to order reimbursement
to plaintiff of 32% of the medical and temporary total disability
payments advanced to Richard M. Camp.

The Commission erroneously

interpreted §35-1-69 U.C.A. to mean that the employer is
responsible for employability factors in addition to the percentage of physical impairment caused by the industrial
accident.

The result, contrary to §35-1-69, is that the em-

ployer is made to pay for an injured employee's age, lack of
education, lack of intelligence, lack of job availability,
and the fact that because of the above an employee is not
a good candidate for vocational rehabilitation.
The Industrial Commission shall . . . assess
the liability for compensation and medical care
to the employer on the basis of the percentage
of permanent physical impairment attributable
to the industrial injury only and the remainder
shall be payable out of the Special Fund . . .
(emphasis added)
§35-1-69 U.C.A.
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This case should be remanded to the Industrial Commission
with instructions that an Order be entered directing the
Special Fund reimburse plaintiffs 32% of the amounts paid
for medical care and for temporary total compensation.
DATED this

day of September, 1980.
BLACK & MOORE

I
.1
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,
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